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1 Introduction
In the U.S. economy a male in the top 5th percentile earns about 8.6 times the
labor income of one in the bottom 5th. The correlation between a father’s and
a son’s earnings is high, too, somewhere between 0.40 and 0.65. Many take
this as prima facie evidence that markets fail. They believe that diﬀerences
in ability cannot be so great as to explain such great diﬀerences in income.
They also feel that the transmission of genetic factors across generations
cannot be so high as to explain this low degree of intergenerational mobility.
This may be true.
The problem for the economist is that ability is not well observed. Fur-
ther, psychometric testing provides ordinal, and not cardinal, measures of
ability. Consequently, they say little about the dispersion in ability.1 Also,
there is evidence suggesting that testing is inﬂuenced by family background,
factors such as whether one’s parents went through a divorce early in life.2
Family background in turn is related to family income. Furthermore, even if
a true measure of ability could be found you would need to know how ability
translates into earnings, ceteris paribus. This translation will depend on the
economy’s production technologies, at a minimum. Should a person with
twice the ability of another earn four times as much or one half as much?
Who knows?
An obvious factor inﬂuencing earnings may be investments by parents in
the human capital of their children. Poor parents have less wherewithal to
invest in their children than do rich ones. They also can’t borrow against
their oﬀspring’s income in order to ﬁnance their kid’s human capital forma-
tion. This will lead to parental background being an important determinantEfficient Investment in Children 2
in income, besides ability.3 It will lead to persistence in income across the
generations of a dynasty. There may be public programs that can alleviate
such imperfections. It is important to invest in children, however, while they
are still young. To quote Heckman [7, p. 96]:
“The reason is this: Cognitive ability is formed relatively early in
life and becomes less malleable as children age. By age 14, basic
cognitive abilities seem to be fairly well set. Since ability pro-
motes academic progress, successful interventions early in the life
cycle of learning lead to higher overall achievement. By the time
individuals ﬁnish high school, scholastic ability is determined, and
tuition policy will have little eﬀect on college attendance.”
And, Currie and Thomas [5] ﬁnd that school test scores at the age of 7 are
signiﬁcant determinants of future labor market outcomes. Therefore, the
focus of the current analysis is on children where such market imperfections
are likely to weigh the heaviest, as opposed to young adults.
So, what determines parental investment in children? The answer to this
question will depend upon how the world is viewed. To gain some insight into
this issue, an overlapping generations model is constructed where children
diﬀer by ability. Ability has a random component to it. In line with the
classic papers by Becker and Tomes [3] and Loury [14], the productivity
of an adult is determined by his ability and the amount of human capital
investment that his parents undertook when he was a child. The amount
that a parent invests in a child depends on how altruistic parents are toward
children, as well as upon the assumed structure of markets.Efficient Investment in Children 3
Several diﬀerent market structures are analyzed. To begin with, the ef-
ﬁcient equilibrium is modelled. Then, a world with incomplete ﬁnancial
markets is entertained. There are two sources of incompleteness. First,
parents are unable to purchase insurance on the ability of their grandchil-
dren. Second, they face borrowing constraints when educating their children.
Speciﬁcally, a parent cannot pass on any debts to his oﬀspring. The analysis
here has the ﬂavor of Aiyagari [1] and Laitner [12], who analyze the behavior
of savings in an economy with incomplete ﬁnancial markets and idiosyncratic
risk. While the focus is diﬀerent, the work here is also related to Knowles’s
[11] study of the implications of the Becker and Barro [2] fertility model,
where parents decide upon both the quality and quantity of children, for
modeling the distribution of income. Next, the lack of child-care markets is
introduced into the environment with incomplete ﬁnancial markets. In this
situation a parent must use his own time to improve the human capital of
his child.
The implications of these varying structures on eﬃciency, output, and the
distribution of income are catalogued. In the general equilibrium model de-
veloped here, the absence of insurance markets and the presence of borrowing
constraints does not necessarily lead to underinvestment in children. It can
lead to overinvestment. The investment is ineﬃcient, however, in the sense
that it is not directed toward the children who warrant it the most. Impure
altruism towards children has a big impact on investment in children. This
may be troubling for economists. The fact that tastes are interdependent,
in the sense that a child’s welfare enters a parent’s utility function, does not
imply that an equilibrium lacks Pareto optimality.4 How a parent should loveEfficient Investment in Children 4
his oﬀspring takes one outside of the realm of economics. Tastes may evolve
over time, though, since a little over one hundred years ago children had a
capital asset aspect associated with them; they were expected to work when
young and to provide old-age support to their parents when grown up.
2 Environment
Generational Structure: The environment is a discrete-time inﬁnite-horizon
economy with periods denoted by t ∈ {0,1,2,3,...}.I ne a c hp e r i o dt h e r ei s
a continuum of children. Adults live for two periods. In the ﬁrst period of
life they are young, while in the second period they are old. At the end of
each period t the old adults die. They are replaced by a new generation of
children spawned by the period-t generation of young adults. These children
will become young adults in period t+1 who will then have their own children.
Life goes on in the future in similar fashion.
Ability and Productivity: Children are distributed according to innate
ability, a. A child’s ability may be a function of his parent’s ability, a−1,i n
line with the cumulative distribution function, A(a|a−1). The distribution
function A is taken as a primitive. The ability of a child is perfectly known
in period t. The initial distribution for abilities will be given by A0 = A
where A(x)=
R
A(x|a)dA(a). That is, initial abilities are drawn from the
stationary distribution associated with A with the implication that the cross-
sectional distribution of ability will be given by At = A for all t.
Adults diﬀer according to their productivities, π.P a r e n t sc a n i n ﬂuence
the productivity of their oﬀspring by investing time and money in them.
There is a ﬁxed cost φ associated with educating a child. Now, consider aEfficient Investment in Children 5
young parent who invests m units of resources (in addition to the ﬁxed cost
φ)a n dn units of child-care time in his child. The child will grow up next
period with productivity, π0, as described by
π
0 = H(a,m,n), (1)
where H(a,m,n)=a if either n =0or m =0 . The function H is taken as
ap r i m i t i v e . A s s u m et h a tH is strictly increasing in all its arguments and
that H12, H13,a n dH23 > 0. Furthermore, suppose that H is strictly concave
in m and n, both jointly and separately. When resources are invested in a
child he will be labeled as skilled. Otherwise, he will be called unskilled. The
above assumptions guarantee that an eﬃcient allocation will dictate that the
amount of money and time invested in a child will increase with ability.
Goods Production: Each young adult has one unit of time. He can spend
his time either manufacturing goods or supplying services on a child-care
market. If a young adult spends one unit of time making goods then he
can supply π eﬃciency units of labor in production. Suppose that this adult
had drawn the ability level a−1 last period as a child. A unit of time in
child-care then generates a−1 eﬃciency units of labor in this activity. Skilled
agents have a comparative advantage in manufacturing goods since for them
π >a −1 while for unskilled agents π = a−1. Old adults can’t work. Output,
o, is produced according to the constant-returns-to-scale production function
o = O(k,l),
where k and l are the aggregate quantities of capital and labor used in pro-
duction. Aggregate labor is the sum over the eﬃciency units of eﬀort supplied
by individuals to manufacturing.Efficient Investment in Children 6
Output can be used for consumption, c, investment in capital goods, i,
and investment in children, m.I no t h e rw o r d s
c + i + m = o.
Capital goods accumulate according to the law of motion
k
0 =( 1− δ)k + i. (2)
3E ﬃciency
What will an eﬃcient markets equilibrium look like? To answer this ques-
tion some notation will be introduced. Let Πt (π) denote the distribution of
adults according to productivity in period t. The initial distribution Π0 is
predetermined, while future Π’s will be determined endogenously in a man-
ner discussed below. The amount of time that a young adult of productivity
π spends in production in period t will be represented by Lt(π). In similar
fashion, Mt (a) will specify the amount of goods invested (excluding the ﬁxed
cost φ)i np e r i o dt on a child of ability a. Likewise Nt (a) will denote the
quantity of young adult time spent in period t on a type-a child. Note that
in an eﬃcient markets equilibrium investment in a child will depend solely on
the child’s ability and nothing else, such as the ability of his or her parents.
Given this notation, the productivity distributions evolve as follows:
Πt+1 (π)=m{a : H (a,Mt (a),N t (a)) ≤ π}, (3)
where m is the measure on the set of abilities corresponding to the stationary
distribution, A.5 Let
St = {a : H (a,Mt (a),N t (a)) >a },Efficient Investment in Children 7
so that St represents the set of children in period t that become skilled in
t +1 . The set of unskilled children, Ut, will be given by the complement of
this set so that Ut = Sc
t.
The amount of goods invested in children is given by m =
R
S[M (a)+
φ]dA(a), so the resource constraint for this economy reads
c + i +
Z
S
[M (a)+φ]dA(a) ≤ O(k,l). (4)
Finally, the amount of labor that is used in production (measured in eﬃciency
units) must be less than the total supply of it minus the amount that is used







Assuming that only unskilled agents work in the child-care sector (discussed
in the next section), the amount demanded for child care in any period t







3.1 Characterizing Eﬃcient Allocations
Eﬃciency means that it is not possible to have more consumption at some
date without having less consumption at some other, assuming that leisure
is not valued. The problem of eﬃcient investment in children is to determine
the schedules Lt (π), Mt (a) and Nt(a) in each period given this eﬃciency
criterion.
Characterizing the schedule Lt is straightforward. Assume that there
are a suﬃcient number of unskilled agents to meet the economy’s child-careEfficient Investment in Children 8
requirements. It’s obvious that there should be some π∗
t such that
Lt (πt)=1 ,i f πt ≥ π∗
t,
Lt (πt) ≤ 1,i f πt ≤ π∗
t.
(6)
This follows because skilled agents have a comparative advantage in goods
production; that is, their productivity in goods production, πt, exceeds their
productivity in child care, at−1.N o w ,s i n c eπt+1 = H(at,M t(at),N t(at)),i t
transpires that any cutoﬀ rule for πt+1,o rπ∗
t+1 will amount to a cutoﬀ rule
for at,o ra∗
t.

























T h eP l a n n i n gP r o b l e m :L e t {pt}t≥0 be a sequence of ‘eﬃciency prices’
with pt > 0 for all t. Then any allocation which maximizes
P
t≥0 ptct is
eﬃcient. Interpret pt/pt+1 = rt as the gross interest rate from t to t+1.T h e
primary interest here is in steady states. Without loss of generality, look
at the problem of maximizing (ptct + pt+1ct+1) with respect to a∗
t+1, Mt (a),
Nt (a) and kt+1 and then look at the steady-state versions of the ﬁrst-order
necessary conditions characterizing the solution.




























[Mt+1 (a)+φ]dA(a)}.Efficient Investment in Children 9





t)+φ] − pt+1O2(·t +1 ) [ H(·t +1 )− a∗
t]=0 , (8)
Mt(a): −pt + pt+1O2(·t +1 ) H2(·t +1 )=0(for Mt (a) > 0), (9)
Nt(a): −ptO2(·t)+pt+1O2(·t +1 ) H3(·t +1 )=0(for Nt (a) > 0), (10)
kt+1: pt = pt+1[O1(·t +1 )+( 1− δ)]. (11)
The notation X(·t) signiﬁes that the function X is being evaluated at its
date-t arguments.










wH2(a,M(a),N(a)) = r (for M (a) > 0), (13)
H3(a,M(a),N(a)) = r (for N (a) > 0), (14)
r = O1(·)+( 1− δ). (15)
Here
w = O2(·) (16)
represents the wage rate for an eﬃciency unit of labor. Equation (12) states
that the cost of becoming skilled, M(a∗)+φ + N(a∗)w, should equal the
beneﬁt or the discounted skill premium, wH(a∗,M(a∗),N(a∗))/r−wa∗/r,a t
the cutoﬀ level of ability, a∗. Again note that equation (12) can equivalentlyEfficient Investment in Children 10
be thought of as deﬁn i n gac u t o ﬀ rule for productivity, π∗, which is deﬁned
by π∗ = H(a∗,M(a∗),N(a∗)). Next, society should invest time in a child up
until the point where the discounted marginal return wH3(a,M(a),N(a))/r
equals the cost of the extra child care, w.T h i si sw h a t( 14) states. Condition
(13) states a similar condition for resources. Last, (15) is a standard condition
equating the marginal product of capital to the interest rate.
The solution has the following feature. As noted, skilled adults spend
all their time producing. Some unskilled adults will devote their time to
producing, while others will spend it taking care of children. Some children
will have positive amounts of adult time and goods invested in them and
will (when they become young adults) work full time in production as skilled
agents. The rest of the children will have zero adult time and goods invested
in them and will (when they become young adults) work as unskilled agents
either in production or taking care of the next generation of children. Basi-
cally, the above conclusion is a result of the assumption that skilled agents
have a comparative advantage in producing manufacturing goods.
4M a r k e t A r r a n g e m e n t s
The Setting:C a nt h ee ﬃcient allocation be supported as a competitive equi-
librium? To answer this question, something has to be said about preferences.
Assume that adults are matched one-to-one with children and that each adult





0], 0 < β < 1,0 < θ ≤ 1, (17)Efficient Investment in Children 11
where cy and co0 are his consumptions when young and old. Here V 0 denotes
the expected lifetime utility that his child will realize upon growing up. The
young adult attaches the weight θ to his oﬀspring’s expected lifetime utility
and he discounts the future at rate β.6 The analysis presumes that children
cannot transact for themselves. Hence, there would be no investment in a
child if it was not for his parent’s altruism (i.e., if it wasn’t for the fact that
θ > 0) .T h ec a s ew h e r eθ < 1 will be labeled “impure” altruism.7
There are one-period ahead complete insurance markets so that an adult
can insure against the ability level of his grandchild next period. Since the
focus of the analysis is on steady states, all prices will be assumed to be
constant over time. Let q(a0|a) denote the price of a claim which delivers
one unit of consumption next period if the grandchild’s ability level is a0 and
nothing otherwise, conditional on the young adult having a child of ability a.
The quantity of such claims that the young adult purchases is s(a0|a).L a s t ,
the young adult can leave, when old, a bequest to his oﬀspring, if he desires.
In particular, if he wants his oﬀspring to receive b0 units of consumption in a
bequest then he will have to put aside b0/r units of consumption when old,
where r is the market rate of interest on a one-period bond. This bequest
can be negative.
Choice Problems: The dynamic-programming problem facing a young
p a r e n tc a nn o wb ew r i t t e na s














subject to (1)a n d
c






0 = wπ, (19)Efficient Investment in Children 12






1, π0 >a ,
















When the agent is old he will have a wealth level of s(a0|a)+b and a grandchild
of ability a0. At this time the agent will have to decide how much to leave to
his adult child in bequests or b0. Problem (20) describes the decision making
at this stage of life. Therefore, J(·) is the indirect utility function for an old
adult.8,9
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions associated with this problem are:
s(a0|a): U1(cy)q (a0|a)=βJ3(π0,a 0,s(a0|a)+b)A1(a0|a), (22)
m : U1(cy)=βH2(a,m,n)
R
J1 (π0,a 0,s(a0|a)+b)A1 (a0|a)da0
(when m>0),
(23)
n : U1(cy)w = βH3(a,m,n)
R




b0 : U1(co0)/r = θV3(π0,a 0,b 0). (25)Efficient Investment in Children 13
L a s t ,a na p p l i c a t i o no ft h eB e n v e n i s t ea n dS c h e i n k m a na n de n v e l o p et h e -
























The Perfectly-Pooled Steady State: Now, in a perfectly-pooled steady
state all young agents will consume the same amount, cy.10 Likewise, all old
agents will have the identical level of consumption, co. From (25), (27), and
(29) it then transpires that
r =1 /(βθ). (30)
If θ =1then r =1 /β, the standard result for the neoclassical growth model.
Alternatively, when the parent cares more about his own utility than his oﬀ-
springs, or when θ < 1, it happens that r>1/β. Here parents place a higher
weight on present consumption relative to the dynasty’s future consumption.
This dissuades savings and drives up the interest rate. In a perfectly-pooled




From (22) this will imply that
U1(c
y)=βrU1(c
o).Efficient Investment in Children 14
Therefore, cy <c o when θ < 1.





> 0, if wn+ m + φ <w [H(a,m,n) − a]/r,




T h e s ea r et h es a m ec o n d i t i o n sa s( 12), (13), and (14). Therefore, the eﬃcient
allocation can be supported by a competitive equilibrium with complete in-
surance markets. Markets are still eﬃc i e n te v e nw h e np a r e n t sd on o tc a r e
about their oﬀs p r i n g sa sm u c ha st h e m s e l v e s .
4.1 Numerical Example One
An example of the eﬃcient markets equilibrium will now be provided. Certain
aspects of this example will be maintained in the subsequent two examples.12
Additionally, some parameter values are chosen so that certain features of
Example Two, which analyzes the economy with incomplete markets, are in
accord with the U.S. data. Take the unit of time for a period to be 20 years.
Tastes: Suppose that parents care about their children as much as they
care about themselves; i.e., let θ =1 . The discount factor is set so that
β =0 .9120 =0 .15. From (30) this implies that in the eﬃcient markets case,
the (annualized) interest rate will be 9.9 percent. This value for the discountEfficient Investment in Children 15
factor is selected so that the incomplete markets example can replicate the
interest rate and investment-to-GDP ratio observed in the U.S. economy.





In the U.S. economy labor’s share of income is about 64 percent. So, set
α =0 .36. In the U.S. capital depreciates about 10 percent a year implying
that δ =1− (1 − 0.10)20 =0 .88.
Ability and Productivity: Assume abilities lie in the discrete set A =
{a1,a 2,...,a15} and evolve in line according with a m-state Markov chain. In
particular, suppose that
Aij =P r [ a
0 = aj|a = ai].
The Markov chain for ability is tuned, following the procedure of Tauchen
[23], to match the stochastic process lna0 = ι(1 − ω)+ω lna + σ
√
1 − ω2ζ,
where ι =1 .0/(1 − 0.35), ω =0 .35, σ =0 .45 and ζ ∼ N(0,1). Next, little




ε +( 1− τ)m
ε]
ρ/ε + a, ε ≤ 1. (32)
For now simply assume that χ =1 .55, τ =0 .65, ε =0 .32,a n dρ =0 .16.T h e
ﬁxed cost of becoming skilled is set so that φ =0 .13.
At this stage simply take the choice of parameters values as given for
the stochastic process governing ability and the human capital production
function. They have been picked so that distribution of income arising inEfficient Investment in Children 16
the incomplete markets model is in congruence with U.S. observation. This
choice of parameter values is discussed in further detail in Example Two.
Algorithm: The equilibrium is computed as follows: To begin with note
from (30) that, given a value for 1/(βθ), the interest rate is known. Since the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale this implies from (15)
that k/l is known too, since O1(·) is homogeneous of degree zero. Conse-
quently, the equilibrium wage rate w = O2(·) is also known, since O2(·) also
depends solely on the k/l ratio. Given w, equations (13) and (14) can then
be used to compute M(a) and N(a) for each value of a. The solutions for w,
M(a) and N(a) are then used to calculate the threshold level of ability, a∗,
using (12). Last, for the equilibrium to be meaningful, the child-care market
clearing condition (5) must hold.
4.1.1 Results
The upshot of the example is shown in Figure 1, which plots the ability and
productivity distributions for the population. These distributions are repre-
sented by step functions portraying the relevant histogram. The threshold
level of ability lies at about the 6th decile; i.e., only the top 40 percent become
skilled. There is a jump in the productivity distribution at this point. Also,
observe that the productivity distribution is more skewed than the ability
one. For future reference, let W denote the set of productivities that obtains
in the eﬃcient markets equilibrium. The fact that high-ability individuals
have more time and resources invested in them ampliﬁes wage inequality.
This isn’t an issue in an eﬃcient markets equilibrium, since all actors enjoy
the same level of consumption.Efficient Investment in Children 17
Impure Altruism: Now consider the case where altruism is impure. Specif-
ically, let θ =0 .5. When parents care less about their children they leave
less in bequests. Hence, aggregate savings will be less and the steady-state
interest rate higher. This fact can be seen immediately from (30). The (an-
nualized) interest rate rises from 9.9 to 13.8 percent. The capital-labor ratio
drops by about 110 percent. Additionally, one would expect that parents
will now invest less in their children too. They do. The aggregate amounts
of money and time invested in children fall by 278 percent and 251 percent,
respectively. As a result, output drops by 106 percent. This translates into
a decrease in consumption. When altruism is pure individuals consume an
equal amount in each period, since the interest rate is equal to the rate of
time preference. When altruism is impure their consumption proﬁle slopes
up over time, since the interest rate is higher than their discount factor.
Consumption when young falls by a 120 percent, while consumption when
old drops by 86 percent. While this equilibrium may seem horrifying relative
to the previous one, remember that it is still eﬃcient. Last, observe from
Figure 1 that inequality is reduced.
The standard overlapping generations model: Consider the case where
θ =0 .N o w , a s θ → 0 equation (30) implies that r →∞ .T h i s i s n ’ t t h e
standard overlapping generations model, however, as might appear at ﬁrst
glance. As the old care less about their oﬀspring they borrow more against
their children’s income. This drives up the interest rate. In the standard
overlapping generations model the old can’t borrow against their oﬀspring’s
income; that is, θ =0and b0 ≥ 0. In this setting no parent would invest
in his child. Hence, the steady-state supply of labor will be l = E[a]. Next,Efficient Investment in Children 18
each adult will save according to maxs{U(wa − s/r)+βU(s)}.T h i sy i e l d s
the standard eﬃciency condition U1(wa − s/r)=βrU1(s). Now, suppose
that U(c)=[ c1−µ − 1]/(1 − µ). Then the solution for savings will be given
by s = S(a;w,r) = wa/[(βr)−1/µ + r−1]. The steady-state stock of capital
is given by k = E[S(a;w,r)/r]. This allows the wage and interest rates
to be expressed as w = O2(E(s)/[rE(a)]) = (1 − α)[E(s)/(rE(a))]α and
r = O1(E(s)/[rE(a)]) + (1 − δ) = α[rE(a)/E(s)]1−α +( 1− δ). Finally, it is
easy to deduce that E[a]/E[s]=[ ( βr)−1/µ+r−1]/w = {[(βr)−1/µ+r−1]/[(1−
α)r−α]}1/(1−α). Therefore, r = r[α/(1 − α)][(βr)−1/µ + r−1]+( 1− δ).
In the standard overlapping generations model the interest rate is 6.2
percent (when µ =2 .0), below the 9.9 percent for the eﬃcient markets equi-
librium. The capital/labor ratio is higher by 110 percent. The capital stock
is only slightly higher, though, about 23 percent. The reason is that the
aggregate stock of labor is much smaller (87 percent or so), since there is no
investment in children. This translates into aggregate consumption being 50
percent lower. The coeﬃcient of variation in labor income is the same as the
coeﬃcient of variation in ability, or 0.45. Therefore, wage inequality is much
lower in the standard overlapping generations model.
With the eﬃcient markets equilibrium in mind, it is now possible to
discuss various sources of ineﬃciencies in a decentralized system.
5 Lack of Insurance and Loan Markets
The Setting: The idealized world modeled above assumes that each parent
can buy insurance on the ability of his grandchild. Those parents who draw a
low-ability child are compensated with a cash payment ﬁnanced by premiumsEfficient Investment in Children 19
paid by parents with a high-ability kid. Further, it also assumes that each
parent can pass on a debt to his child. It’s time to come down from this
rareﬁed peak.
Suppose that parents can no longer buy or sell insurance. Instead they
are free to trade one-period bonds subject to the proviso that they cannot
pass on any debts to their oﬀspring. Hence, they can self insure against
the ability of their descendents by accumulating a stockpile of assets. Let b
denote the (nonnegative) bequest a young adult inherits upon his parent’s
death and b0 represent the amount that he will leave his child. The amount
of savings that a young adult carries over for his old age will be given by s.
The non-negativity of bequests rules out a credit market. Adults with low
productivity and high-ability children are unable to borrow in order to un-
dertake the eﬃcient amount of investment in their children. Public education
might mitigate this ineﬃciency somewhat. For instance, if a child’s ability is
currently not known and is independently distributed across generations, or
if the productivity of investment is independent of the child’s ability level,
then eﬃciency dictates a uniform level of investment in all children regardless
of ability. Borrowing constrained adults may undertake lower investments.13
Choice Problems: After the birth of his child, a young adult’s state of
the world will be given by his productivity, π, the ability of his oﬀspring, a,
and the bequest he will receive from his parent, b. At this stage, the only
randomness in his life will be the ability level of his grandchild, a0.T h e
dynamic programming problem facing a young parent is








0}, (33)Efficient Investment in Children 20
subject to (1)a n d
c
y + m + φI(π














0/r = s + b.
When the individual is old he will have a wealth level of s + b,ag r o w n
child with productivity π0, and a grandchild of ability a0. At this time the
agent will have to decide how much to leave to his adult child in bequests
or b0. Problem (34) describes the decision making at this time. Therefore,
J(·0) is the indirect utility function for the old adult. Denote the decision
rules for s, m, n,a n db0 that arise out of these problems by s = S(π,a,b),
m = M(π,a,b), n = N(π,a,b),a n db0 = B(π0,a 0,s+ b).
If the young parent chooses not to educate his oﬀspring then π0 = a and
m = n =0 . If the individual chooses to educate his oﬀspring then π0 >a






J1(π0,a 0,b 0)A1(a0|a)da0 (when m>0),
and
n : U1(cy)w = βH3(a,m,n)
R
J1(π0,a 0,b 0)A1(a0|a)da0 (when n>0).Efficient Investment in Children 21
The last two equations imply that
wH2(a,m,n)=H3(a,m,n). (35)
Equation (35) is also implied by (9) and (10). Therefore, while the lack of
insurance might inﬂuence the level of investment in a child as measured by
the attained level of productivity, π0, it does not distort the decision about
whether to invest cash, m,o rt i m e ,n.
The Steady State: Again focus on a stationary equilibrium for the econ-
omy. In a competitive equilibrium the interest and wage rates will once again
be given by (15) and (16). In a stationary equilibrium the time-series mean of
some variable for the agent will also equal the cross-sectional average across
agents at any point in time. The aggregate supplies of capital and labor will
be given by15
l = E[π] − E[n],
k = E[s/r + b/r].
5.1 Numerical Example Two
Setup: An example of the incomplete markets equilibrium will now be com-






Let the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion assume a standard value of 2
so that µ =2 . Retain the speciﬁcation of tastes, technology, ability andEfficient Investment in Children 22
productivity from the previous example. Hence, α =0 .36, β =0 .15, θ =1 .0,
δ =0 .88, ι =1 .0/(1−0.35), ω =0 .35, σ =0 .45, χ =1 .55, τ =0 .65, ε =0 .32,
ρ =0 .16,a n dφ =0 .13.
Algorithm: Problems (33) and (34) are computed on a discrete space.
Speciﬁcally, assume that π ∈ P ≡ {π1,...,π100} ⊃ A ∪ W, s + b ∈ S ≡
{υ1,...,υ125},a n db ∈ B ≡ {b1,...,b125}.16 Problem (33) can be rewritten as
V (πi,a j,b k)= m a x
υ∈S,π0∈P
{U(wπ + bk/r − C(aj,π













m,n {m + φ + wn : π0 = H(a,m,n)}, if π0 >a ,
0,i f π0 = a.
(37)
Observe that equations (1) and (35) solve (37). Also, note that it is easy to
recover the solution for s from the above problem since s = υ−bk. Likewise,
problem (34) reads





Now, to compute the solution for J one needs to know the solution for V
and vice versa. This is a ﬁxed-point problem. This problem is solved using
the following iterative scheme. Suppose that one enters some iteration j with
a guess for V , denoted by V j. Given the interest rate, r,a n dt h eg u e s s ,V j,
one can then solve (38) to obtain a guess for J, represented by Jj.T h e na
revised guess for V ,o rV j+1, can be obtained by computing the solution to
(36), given Jj, r and w. And so the algorithm goes on until V j+1 → V j and
Jj+1 → Jj. Of course one needs to compute the solutions for the equilibriumEfficient Investment in Children 23
interest and wage rates, r and w. The details of the algorithm are in the
appendix.
5.1.1 Results
Precautionary Savings: To begin with, the (annualized) interest rate in the
incomplete markets economy is 5.0 percent. This is somewhat shy of the
6.9 percent return on capital reported by Cooley and Prescott [4]. It is also
l e s st h a nt h e( a n n u a l i z e dp e r c e n t a g e )r a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eo f(1−β
1/20)×
100% = 9.0 percent. The investment-to-GDP ratio is 0.13, close to the 0.11
observed in the postwar U.S. As has been noted by Aiyagari [1] and Laitner
[12], in economies with uninsured idiosyncratic risk individuals will tend
to engage in precautionary saving. That is, they build up buﬀer stocks of
ﬁnancial assets to self insure against a run of bad luck. These precautionary
savings drive down the interest rate. As a result of this precautionary savings,
the capital stock in the incomplete markets economy is 147 percent higher
than in the eﬃcient markets case. In the model, b/(b+s)=1 /3;t h a ti s ,o n e
third of total wealth is made up by intergenerational transfers. Modigliani
[16] reports that estimates of this number for the U.S. range from 1/5 to 4/5.
Additionally, individuals invest 60 percent more money in children, but
about the same amount of time as before. Now, 75 percent of children become
skilled as opposed to 41 percent previously. Therefore, borrowing constraints
(in the presence of idiosyncratic risk) do not necessarily lead to underinvest-
ment in children, as is typically presumed.17 It does lead to misinvestment,
however. The total supply of labor in market production is now 1.0 per-
cent lower. This transpires because human capital investment is not directedEfficient Investment in Children 24
toward the most able individuals.
To see the eﬀect that idiosyncratic risk has on precautionary savings, cut
the standard deviation of the ability shock by half so that σ =0 .22.T h e
mean level of ability remains unchanged. The interest rate rises from 5.0 to
6.2 percent, while the capital stock drops by 61 percent. Both the money
and time invested in children falls (7.5 percent and 39.8). The number of
children who become skilled also decreases by 3.5 percentage points.
Inequality: Figure 2 plots the distributions of ability and productivity.
The ability distribution is portrayed by a step function while the productiv-
ity distribution is illustrated by a discrete density function. The distribution
of productivities is approximately lognormal and resembles the U.S. earnings
distribution – as documented by Knowles [11]. The coeﬃcient of variation
in productivity is about 0.78, close to the 0.77 observed in the data. Likewise,
the Gini coeﬃcient for the distribution of income in the model is 0.39 versus
0.35 in data. Solon [20] reports that for the U.S. the correlation of earnings
across generations is about 0.52; in the model it is 0.64.18 The distribution of
productivities does not arise in a straightforward manner from the distribu-
tion of abilities. The distribution of productivities is more skewed than the
distribution of abilities, as can be seen from Figure 2. The match between
the model and the U.S. data is obtained by picking the parameters govern-
ing the ability distribution in conjunction with the parameters governing the
production of human capital.
Does the presence of incomplete insurance increase income inequality?
The answer is no. There is less inequality in productivity across individuals
in the incomplete markets world relative to the eﬃcient one. This is readilyEfficient Investment in Children 25
seen by comparing Figures 1 and 2. The Gini coeﬃcient in the eﬃcient mar-
kets case is 0.51, as opposed to 0.39 here. The ratio of productivities earned
by the top 5 percent relative to the bottom 5 percent is 20.57, compared with
27.15f o rt h ee ﬃcient markets world. In the eﬃcient markets world inequality
isn’t a problem; however, since everybody enjoys the same consumption due
to perfect risk sharing. There may be reasons why inequality may be less
in the incomplete markets world. First, borrowing constraints may reduce
the ability of parents to invest in highly talented children, arguing for lower
dispersion. Second, given the lack of insurance markets, parents may want
to invest more in their children’s human capital (irregardless of ability) to
insure against idiosyncratic risk – recall that the interest rate is lower in
this world.
Welfare Gain from Completing Markets: So, what is the welfare loss that
arises from the uninsured idiosyncratic risk? Some care must be exercised
when assessing this. Steady-state output is 52 percent higher in the incom-
plete markets economy, as compared with the eﬃcient one. Average con-
sumption is 43 percent higher too. Utility is higher as a consequence. Surely,
the average agent can’t be better oﬀ in the incomplete markets economy as
opposed to the eﬃcient one. The answer to this apparent contradiction lies
in the comparison of steady states. Recall that in the incomplete markets
economy there is overaccumulation due to precautionary savings. This leads
to high levels of output, average consumption, and utility.
Now imagine starting the eﬃcient markets economy from the steady-state
capital stock and productivity distribution that obtain in the incomplete
markets economy.19 Over time this economy will converge to the eﬃcientEfficient Investment in Children 26
markets steady state. Would a young agent prefer the utility realized in this
economy or the average level of expected utility level that obtains in the




t=0 be the path of consumptions
that will arise in the eﬃcient markets economy and E[V ] denote the average
level of expected utility in the incomplete markets economy. The agent would
be willing to increase his consumption in each period by λ × 100% and still
be happy to live in the eﬃcient markets economy, where
λ = {








Observe that as the level of expected utility in the incomplete markets econ-
omy, E[V ], increases the fraction of eﬃcient markets consumption that the
agent would be willing to give up, or λ, falls. Clearly solving for λ requires
computing the transitional dynamics for the eﬃcient markets economy. The
a l g o r i t h mu s e dt od ot h i si sd e t a i l e di nt h ea p p e n d i x .
It turns out that λ = −0.63, so that an individual would prefer to live in
the eﬃcient markets economy. Along the transition path from the incomplete
to complete markets economy the individual temporarily increases his con-
sumption as the economy runs down its stocks of physical and human capital.
The time path for aggregate consumption is shown in Figure 3, which also
plots the evolution of the economy’s productivity distribution.20 The rapid
convergence to the eﬃcient-markets steady state should be expected given
t h a tap e r i o di s2 0y e a r s .
In fact more can be said than this. It is possible to compute the com-
pensating variation for a person starting oﬀ from any initial condition, or
(π,a,b)-combination, in the incomplete markets economy. Intuitively, one
would expect that an agent with high values for π, a,a n db w o u l dg a i nl e s sEfficient Investment in Children 27
from such a move than an individual with low values for these variables — re-
call that in the eﬃcient markets economy all people within a given generation
enjoy the same level of consumption. The distribution of these compensating
variations is plotted in Figure 4. Note that everybody is made better oﬀ from
the regime switch, although the person with lowest expected utility in the
i n c o m p l e t em a r k e t se c o n o m yg a i n sa b o u t3t i m e sa sm u c ha st h ep e r s o nw i t h
the highest utility.
Impure altruism, again: Once again set θ =0 .5, implying that parents
care less about their children than themselves. How does the new equilibrium
compare with the incomplete markets economy with pure altruism? The
amount of time that parents invest in their childrens’ human capital falls
by 230 percent, while the amount of goods falls by 183 percent. They also
leave 222 percent less in bequests. The fact that parents are investing less
in the future leads to a rise in the equilibrium interest rate from 5.0 to
6.0 percent as the aggregate capital stock drops by 97 percent. The cut in
human capital investment leads to 66 percent less eﬃciency units of labor
being used in production. The net result of all of this is that output declines
by 77 percent. As θ → 0 the model converges to the standard overlapping
generations structure discussed in the previous section.
6 Lack of Child-Care Facilities
The Setting:T h ee ﬃcient equilibrium presumes that an eﬃcient child-care
market exists. Suppose not. Then, each parent must invest his own time
in his child. Consider a parent of productivity π with bequest b who has a
child of ability a. Assume that a parent of productivity π has a productivityEfficient Investment in Children 28
P(π) in nurturing his own child. For instance, on the one hand, π = P(π)
represents a “quality-time” world where a parent’s productivity in child care





π, π ≤ p∗,
p∗, otherwise,
(39)
could be thought of as a world where child care is a (relatively) low-productivity
occupation that high-productivity agents have no real advantage at. Now,
for each young parent it must transpire that
n/P(π)+l =1 .
In other words, for a parent of productivity π it costs n/P(π) units of time to
provide n eﬃciency units of child care. A non-existent (or badly functioning)
labor market in child care will force highly productive adults to devote time
to child care instead of production.
Choice Problems: The dynamic programming problem facing a young
parent is










subject to (1)a n d
c
y + m + φI(π
0,a)+s/r = wπ(1 − n/P(π)).
Once again J(·0) is deﬁned by (34).
The ﬁrst-order necessary conditions for the young adult are
s : U1(cy)=rβ
R




J1(π0,a 0,b 0)dA1(a0|a) (when m>0),
n : U1(cy)wπ/P(π)=βH3(a,m,n)
R
J1(π0,a 0,b 0)dA1(a0|a) (when n>0).
The last two equations imply that
[wπ/P(π)]H2(a,m,n)=H2(a,m,n). (40)
Equation (40) is similar to (35), with one exception. Now, the parent’s
relative productivity level in nurturing, π/P(π),a ﬀects the decision about
how much time to invest in child care. The more productive the young parent
is in the market vis à vis at home, the more he will favor investing money as
opposed to time in his child, other things equal.
Before proceeding, note that the quality-time case is just simply uninter-
esting. If an individual is equally productive in child care as market work
then he would be indiﬀerent between using his own time in child care or using
it at work. Consider a person of productivity π. To buy π units of quality
time in child care on the market (if it was available) would cost w units of
consumption. The agent could supply the same amount of quality time him-
self and lose w in wage income. Hence, the lack of a child-care market would
be inconsequential. Each parent could easily raise his own child and would
be no cost advantage in letting someone else do it. In the quality-time world
the absence of a child-care market will not matter.
6.1 Numerical Example Three
Setup: The case where child care is a (relatively) low-productivity occupation
is now considered. The parameterization from the incomplete markets caseEfficient Investment in Children 30
(with pure altruism) will be retained. The same numerical algorithm used
to solve the incomplete markets case is employed here. All that remains to
be speciﬁed is the threshold level of productivity, p∗, in (39). It is assumed
that this threshold lies at about the 50th percentile in productivity, implying
that p∗ =8 .5.
6.1.1 Results
Consumption and output both fall by about 6 percent, relative to the in-
complete markets case with child care. This is caused by a 78 percent drop
in child-care time. The amount of goods invested in children only decreases
by 7 percent, though. The fraction of children receiving no investment rises
slightly from 25 to 28 percent. Now, the drop in consumption and output
may seem small. This transpires for three reasons. First, the human capi-
tal production function (32) is very concave. Second, note that the welfare
loss from an ineﬃcient child-care market arises because high-productivity
individuals must spend their time ineﬃciently at home raising their kids as
opposed to working. There will be no loss for those agents with π ≤ p∗.F o r
an individual with productivity π >p ∗ the loss will be w(π/p∗ − 1) per unit
of child-care time. So, a large drop in consumption and output will require
that π − p∗ is large and positive for a signiﬁcant fraction of the population.
This seems unlikely given the shape of the income distribution and the aver-
age earnings of child-care specialists – Figure 5 portrays the situation using
data generated from the model.21 Here the jagged solid line shows the distor-
tion, (π/p∗−1), weighted by the number of aﬀected agents. Third, not much
parental time is involved in the human capital development of children.22Efficient Investment in Children 31
7C o n c l u s i o n s
When discussing the impact of imperfect ﬁnancial markets, Arthur Okun [18,
pp. 80-81] once said that “the most important consequence is the inadequate
development of the human resources of the children of poor families – which,
I would judge, is one of the most serious ineﬃciencies of the American econ-
omy today.” A general equilibrium model was developed here where children
diﬀer by ability. Parents could invest time and goods in the development of
their children’s human capital. The model can be used to examine this type
of claim. In a world with perfect ﬁnancial markets parental investment in a
child would be a function solely of the kid’s ability. Financial markets aren’t
complete, however, in the real world. First, ideally an individual would like
to insure against his grandchild’s ability, as long as there is some randomness
in it. Second, a parent cannot borrow against his child’s future income in
order to educate him today. Given this, the analysis is not as straightfor-
ward as Okun [18] and others presume. In fact in the numerical example
presented, the absence of insurance markets and the presence of borrowing
constraints did not lead to underinvestment in children — more money was
invested in kids. The investment was ineﬃcient, however, in that it was not
directed toward the children with the highest ability.
Another market failure may be the lack of child-care markets. This too
is more problematic than is typically believed. For this market failure to be
severe, the returns in terms of a child’s productivity to an extra unit of in-
vestment in time cannot fall oﬀ too dramatically with the level of investment.
Additionally, there must be a signiﬁcant number of individuals whose pro-
ductivity at work is greater than the productivity of the child-care specialistEfficient Investment in Children 32
who will look after their child. This seems unlikely to be case. As such, it
is likely to be rich people (doctors, lawyers, etc.) and not poor ones (jani-
tors, restaurant waitresses, etc.) that will beneﬁt the most from completing
child-care markets.
Perhaps the problem of underinvestment in children is that altruism is
impure: that is, parents do not care about their children as much as they care
about themselves. Parents invest much less in their children when altruism is
impure. Impure altruism, however, can’t be labelled a market failure in the
traditional sense. The equilibrium may still be Pareto optimal. Over time
the lot of children in society has improved; they no longer work and they
go to school. When analyzing this process, economists often tend to take
agents’ preferences as constant and model it as the outcome of technological
progress. Historians and sociologists often view this process as arising from
shifts in societal attitudes toward children, or changes in preferences. They
arrive at this conclusion by analyzing changes in attitudes towards children
and shifts in childrearing practices, etc. — see Stone [22, chp. 9]. Undoubtedly
both technological and cultural forces are at play in determining the well-
being of children. There is little an economist can say about how goods (here
children) should (as opposed to do) factor into a person’s tastes. This is a
moral question that society may have to take a stand on.
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A Appendix: Algorithms
Incomplete Markets Steady State: The algorithm used to compute the solu-
tion for the incomplete markets case will now be described. The other cases
are computed in a similar manner.
Computing the competitive equilibrium for the incomplete market econ-
omy involves the following steps. To begin with, draw a random time series
of T observations for a using the distribution function A. Call this sample
path {at}T
t=0.
1. Enter iteration j with a guess for the interest and wage rates, r and w,
denoted by rj and wj.
2. Given this guess, solve the choice problems (33) and (34).
3. Simulate the decision rules for (33) and (34) T times using the randomly
generated sample for the a’s. To do this, start at the point (π0,a 0,b 0).
Use the decision rules from problem (33) to get s0, π1. Next, use the
decision rule from problem (34) at the point (π1,a 1,s 0 + b0) to obtain
b1. The decision rules for (33) can now be evaluated at the point
(π1,a 1,b 1) to get s1, π2. Proceed down the rest of the sample path in





t=1.C a l c u l a t eE[s + b0], E[π],a n d
E[n], or the sample means for s + b0, π,a n dn.
4. Compute a revised guess for the interest and wage rates, rj+1 and wj+1.
Since the focus is on a stationary competitive equilibrium, a naturalEfficient Investment in Children 36










Now, in equilibrium aggregate savings will be given by kj = E[s+b0]/rj
and lj = E[π] − E[n].
5. Check if metric(rj+1,r j) and metric(wj+1,w j) fall below some speciﬁed
tolerance. If so, stop. If not, go back to step 1.
The child-care market must clear for an equilibrium to prevail. This ne-





I(πt,a t−1)], where again I(πt,a t−1)=1if πt >a t−1 and I(πt,a t−1)=0if
πt = at−1.
Complete Markets Transitional Dynamics: Let the initial aggregate stock
of capital be represented by k0 and the initial distribution of productivities
be denoted by Π0. Recall that these state variables arise from the incomplete-
markets-economy steady state. The goal is to compute the economy’s tran-
sition path to the eﬃcient markets steady state. Pick a T, suitably large
enough, so that convergence to the new steady state takes place within T +1
periods. Therefore, let kt, lt, mt assume their steady-state values for all
t ≥ T +1 . The algorithm works as follows:













t=1. This implies a guessEfficient Investment in Children 37
for {wt}T
t=1, denoted by {w
j
t}T
t=1.N o t et h a tk0 and E0[π] are tied down
by the initial condition.






2 solve for a∗
0, M0(a),































































Equations (41) to (42) derive from (8) to (9). Equation (43) is the Eu-
ler equation governing capital accumulation and is a rewritten version
of (11). In any perfectly-pooled equilibrium, a young parent’s Euler
equation implies that c
y
t =( βr)−1/µco
t+1. Additionally, it can be shown




t. Aggregating over agents, while
using these two facts, gives ct =( βθr)−1/µct+1. This forms the basis
for (43).Efficient Investment in Children 38
(a) Solving the above system of equations requires an inner loop. That
is, given a guess for l0 and k1, ﬁrst solve for a∗
0, M0(a), N0(a) using
the ﬁrst three equations. Then, revise the guess for l0 and k1using
the l0 = E0[π]−
R
a∗
0 N0(a)dA(a) and (43). Iterate until convergence
in the answers for a∗
0, M0(a), N0(a), l0,a n dk1 is achieved. Exit
the inner loop.







3 solve for a∗
1, M1(a), N1(a), l1,a n dk2 using the

























Exit the algorithm. Additionally, for the solution to be meaningful, it
must also be checked that the child-care market-clearing condition (5)
always holds along the equilibrium path.Efficient Investment in Children 39
FOOTNOTES
1. For example, IQ test scores are normalized to have a mean of 100
and a standard deviation of 15. Hence, dispersion in IQ cannot be used to
measure dispersion in ability.
2. See Heckman, Hsse and Rubinstein [8]. Also, Neal and Johnson [17]
ﬁnd that AFQT scores are inﬂuenced by family background and school en-
vironments.
3. “(T)he disadvantages young black workers now face in the labor market
arise mostly from the obstacles they faced as children in acquiring productive
human capital”, say Neal and Johnson [17, p. 871].
4. So long as the child’s welfare does not enter into someone else’s utility
there will be no incentive for one benefactor to free ride oﬀ another.
5. Let π0 = H(a,N(a),M(a)) ≡ G(a). Now, suppose that G has a




6. These are similar to the preferences considered in a classic paper by
Phelps and Pollak [19]. Each generation assigns a more primal role to its
own utility vis à vis its oﬀspring’s. These preferences are non-stationary,
however, since the next generation will assign a primal role to its own utility.
As Phelps and Pollak [19] note, Frank P. Ramsey termed the practice of
discounting the next generation’s utility “ethically indefensible.”
7. The word impure arises from Edgeworth [6, p. 16] who said “(f)or
between the two extremes of Pure Egoistic and Pure Universalistic there
may be an indeﬁnite number of impure methods; wherein the happiness of
others as compared by the agent (in a calm moment) with his own, neitherEfficient Investment in Children 40
counts for nothing, not (sic) yet ‘counts for one,’ but counts for a fraction.”
8. Observe that each parent assumes that his oﬀspring will do what is
in the descendent’s best interest. That is, while the parent doesn’t assign a
primal role to the oﬀspring’s utility he correctly assumes that his oﬀspring
will. The resulting equilibrium is time consistent.
9. The forms of problems (18) and (20) would become more complicated
if children overlapped more periods with their parents, and/or if children
also cared about their parents. Strategic considerations between parents and
children would then emerge. See Laitner [13] for an excellent review of this
literature.
10. If the economy starts out in a perfectly-pooled equilibrium, then it will
remain there forever. The question about how a perfectly-pooled equilibrium
arose to begin with is ignored. A classic application of the perfect-pooling
concept is Lucas’s [15] study on international asset pricing — see his analysis
for more detail on this notion.
11. Deriving the threshold condition is a little less straightforward. Sub-
stituting equation (21)i n t o( 19) gives a young parent’s lifetime budget con-
straint.
c












So, all a young agent cares about is the present-value of his income, wπ +
R
q(a0|a)bda0, not how it is split up between wages and bequests. Hence,
the young agent’s value function can be rewritten as V (π,a,b)=W(wπ +
R
q(a0|a)bda0,a). In a perfectly-pooled steady state this further simpliﬁes
to V (π,a,b)=W(w(π − a)+wa + b/r,a),s i n c eq(a0|a)=A1(a0|a)/r.N o w
imagine solving problem (18) subject to the additional constraint that m,n >Efficient Investment in Children 41
0; i.e., that the agent’s child becomes skilled. Let m and n denote the
optimal solutions for money and time. Hence π0 = H(a,m,n) >a .I tc o s t s
wn + m+ φ in terms of current resources to provide an individual’s child
with an extra w[H(a,m,n) − a] units of labor income. Now, given the form
of the value function, w[H(a,m,n) − a] in labor income is worth the same
to the child as rw[H(a,m,n) − a] in bequests. But, as is evident from the
lifetime budget constraint, leaving b0 = rw[H(a,m,n) − a] in bequests costs
only
R
q(a0|a)w[H(a,m,n)− a]da0 = w[H(a,m,n)− a]/r in terms of current
resources. Therefore, in order to skill the child it must transpire that
wn+ m + φ <w [H(a,m,n) − a]/r.
12. The examples presented are intended merely to illustrate the theory.
13. Borrowing constraints may be a factor in limiting college attendance,
too. The situation here is diﬀerent for two reasons: ﬁrst, a young adult is
presumably now deciding about his own educational inputs and, second, is
borrowing against his own future income. That is, the young adult is issuing
a claim against his own income and not against his descendents’s incomes.
14. Assume that U1(0) = ∞ so that the individual will avoid hitting the
borrowing constraint at all cost.
15. Let Dy(π,a,b) represent the stationary distribution across young
agents. Now, the distribution A(a0|a) and the decision-rules M(π,a,b),
N(π,a,b), S(π,a,b),a n dB(π0,a 0,s+b) deﬁne a transition operator T y(π0,a 0,b 0|π,a,b).
The stationary distribution Dy must solve Dy(π0,a 0,b 0) =
R
T y(π0,a 0,b 0|π,a,b)dDy(π,a,b).
Hence, l =
R
[π − N(π,a,b)]dDy(π,a,b). Last, the distribution over old
agents, Do(π,a,s −1+b−1), will be deﬁned by Do(π0,a 0,s+b)=
R
To(π0,a 0,s+
b|π,a,b)dDy(π,a,b), where the form of transition operator, To, will dependEfficient Investment in Children 42






16. Recall that W is the set of productivities that emerges in the eﬃcient
markets equilibrium.
17. This seems to derive from the higher level of physical wealth in
economy. Hence, parents can invest more cash in their kids. Additionally,
as the interest rate falls parents substitute out of physical capital and into
human capital.
18. For a review of this literature, see Stokey [21]. The assumed degree
of persistence in ability (ω =0 .35) is not high. According to Hernnstein and
Murray [9] the intergenerational correlation in AFQT scores lies somewhere
between 0.4 and 0.8. Hence, in the model, about one half of the persistence
in income comes from market structure.
19. As before, assume a perfectly-pooled equilibrium. Hence, within each
generation all actors are equally well oﬀ.
20. The left panel shows how the productivity distribution evolves over
time. The initial distribution is portrayed by the discrete density function
shown by the −−lines. The −···− line shows, in step-function form, the
productivity distribution that obtains after one period. The solid line gives
the ﬁnal productivity, again in step-function form.
21. One could argue that the market sector is more eﬃcient at providing
child care than the home sector, say due to economies of scale or special-
ization. Suppose that the market sector is twice as eﬃcient at looking after
children relative to the home sector. To capture this, let P(π)=π/2,f o r
π ≤ p∗,a n dP(π)=p∗/2,o t h e r w i s e . N o w ,t h e r ei sa164 percent drop inEfficient Investment in Children 43
child-care time, while the amount of goods invested falls by 15p e r c e n t ,r e l a -
tive to the incomplete markets case with child care. Consumption and output
are both reduced by 13 percent. Of course, one could just as easily argue
that the market sector is less eﬃcient at providing child care than the home
sector, due to incentive and other problems. For instance, a daycare provider
may not care about your children as much as you do. A recent study ﬁnanced
by the National Institute on Child Health and Human Development found
(as reported by the The New York Times,A p r i l19th 2001) that children
raised in daycare are three times as likely to experience behavioral problems
as those raised primarily by their mothers. The study followed 1,100 children
in 10 cities from a variety of child-care settings.
22. In the U.S., an average mother spends about 3.0 hours a week per
child on direct child care, according to Hill and Staﬀord [10, Table 17.6]. She
had about 2.5 kids (in the postwar period). Direct child care is deﬁned to be
activities such as “helping/teaching, reading/talking (including ‘yelling at’),
indoor playing, outdoor playing, medical care and other regular child care
such as feeding, dressing, supervising, and other direct interaction” (p. 427).
T h et i m es p e n td r o p so ﬀ dramatically as a child ages. For instance, a high-
school educated mother spends about 6.0 hours a week on these activities for
a preschooler, but only about 1.7 hours a week for a child in school. Now, a
parent only raises a child for about 18 of the 40 or so years that he works.
And, the average household puts in about 54 hours of market per week. Thus,
about [2.5×(18/40)×3.0]/(2.5×(18/40)×3.0+54)×100% = 5.9 percent of
a parent’s time is spent on child care, or about 2.4 percent per child. These
numbers seem low. The estimates exclude any purchased time on directEfficient Investment in Children 44
child care. In the incomplete markets model with child-care markets about
E[n]/E[a] × 100% = 2.7 percent of the total feasible time available for child
care is used. In the framework without child-care markets only about 0.9
percent of available parental time is used. Any serious quantitative analysis
would have to obtain accurate statistics on the amount of privately controlled
inputs going into a kid’s human capital production.Efficient Investment in Children 45
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Figure 1: Ability and Productivity Distributions — Eﬃcient Markets Case.Efficient Investment in Children 46












































































Incomplete Markets Steady State
Figure 3: Transitional Dynamics — From Incomplete to Complete.Efficient Investment in Children 48
















Figure 4: Distribution of Compensating Variations.Efficient Investment in Children 49
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Figure 5: Lack of Child-Care Market — Distortion.